How resilient is a country's DNS if the rest of the internet went dark?
Assess how resilient a country's core DNS is if it were cut off from the world.
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What it solves
National resilience teams and policy analysts need a straight answer to whether a country can keep resolving domain names if its links to the rest of the internet go down. Today that answer sits scattered across root-server operator disclosures, BGP looking glasses and facility records that nobody reconciles into one read.
It reads the published root DNS instance list for every letter, matches each instance to a country by its hosting facility and announcing network, then grades sovereignty by how many letters have a local copy and how concentrated those copies are on a handful of operators or networks.
Each root letter publishes its own instance list in its own format, so pulling one country’s coverage means opening a dozen pages and reconciling them by hand.
- each root operator’s own instance-disclosure page
- a BGP looking glass
- PeeringDB
- a spreadsheet to reconcile it all by hand
What this means
- Give it a country code and it counts how many root DNS instances actually sit inside that country’s borders and who runs them.
- It returns a sovereignty grade built from DNS, BGP, physical hosting and geolocation data, crossing the naming, network and physical layers.
Dig deeper
Read the how-to
What this workflow does and how it uses the graph, plus the copy-paste recipes it's built from.
Open the documentationWhy teams run this
The job this flow does, the failure mode it removes, and the proof it produces.
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